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E-book monopolies and the law 
 
Angela Daly* 
 
This article will examine the legality of the digital rights management 
(‘DRM’) measures used by the major e-book publishers and device 
manufacturers in the United States, European Union and Australia not 
only to enforce their intellectual property rights but also to create 
monopolistic content silos, restrict interoperability and affect the ability 
for users to use the content they have bought in the way they wish. The 
analysis will then proceed to the recent competition investigations in 
the US and EU over price-fixing in e-book markets, and the current 
litigation against Amazon in the US for an alleged abuse of its dominant 
position. A final point will be made on possible responses in Australia to 
these issues taking into account the jurisprudence on DRM in other 
scenarios. 
 
Introduction 
 
E-books are electronic books, or book-length publications in digital forms, which can 
consist of text and/or images, and are readable on electronic devices including 
computers, dedicated e-book readers, tablets and other mobile devices. E-books are 
contained in digital files such as the EPUB and AZW formats. Dedicated e-book 
readers are mobile devices whose principal function is to display and store e-books to 
be read by users. Most e-book readers now have some form of internet connectivity, 
either being Wi-Fi enabled or working on 3G mobile networks. This is sometimes 
restricted to having access to online e-book distribution platforms, or one online 
platform in particular from which users can buy e-books to read on their device (as is 
the case with Amazon devices), and sometimes with no general web browsing ability 
for instance. Some e-book stores produce their own e-book device, such as Amazon 
and its Kindle, and Barnes & Noble and its Nook (which at the time of writing is only 
available in the US and the UK). E-book readers with internet connectivity have 
various options for storage: either on the e-book reader itself, on a removable data 
storage card, or in the cloud especially if there is a connection to an e-book store. The 
line between e-book reader, tablet computer and smartphone is somewhat blurred, 
since many tablets and smartphones also facilitate the reading of e-books and 
conversely, e-book readers now increasingly have internet access. Interestingly, the 
trend is now away from dedicated e-book reading devices such as the ‘traditional’ 
Kindle towards multi-functional mobile devices which can support a variety of 
content types, with it being posited that dedicated e-book readers, especially those 
using e-ink, will become a niche market.
1
 
This article will examine various issues around e-books and e-book readers in the 
US, EU and Australia and the legality of the business practices of the major players 
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active in e-book markets in these jurisdictions. Firstly, the characteristics of e-book 
markets in these jurisdictions will be detailed, with emphasis on the emergence of 
Amazon as the leading e-book player along with the entry of Apple into these 
markets. Then, the use of DRM measures in both e-book files and e-book devices will 
be explained and analysed: the use of DRM measures on the one hand can protect 
intellectual property rights but on the other hand can also inhibit interoperability of 
systems, lock out competition (in primary and secondary markets) and prevent users 
from doing otherwise legal things to the files and devices they own, resulting in users 
experiencing more restriction with their digitised content than with their ‘tangible’ 
book equivalents. From there, the article will proceed to focus on the competition 
issues involving e-book markets and the action taken by competition authorities and 
other law enforcement agencies in the EU and US regarding price-fixing and alleged 
abuses of dominance by Apple and Amazon respectively, with an appreciation of the 
implications of these investigations and litigation for e-books and other digital 
content. The relationship between competition law, intellectual property and the use 
of DRM measures in e-book markets will be considered in the wake of this 
enforcement activity, with a final consideration being given to the situation in 
Australia, where so far there has not been any jurisprudence on this issue. It will 
conclude with the suggestion of a possible approach to these issues. 
 
Markets for e-books and e-book readers 
 
Although consumers are still buying more traditional ‘tangible’ books than e-books, 
the markets for e-books are growing, with some predictions that in the US and 
developed Western European countries over half the total amount of books bought in 
the next three years will be e-books.
2
 Thus in developed, especially English-speaking, 
countries, there is a shift to the digital with e-books, similar to what has been seen 
with other forms of content such as music and video. In the US, approximately one in 
five books sold in 2012 were e-books, and e-books are helping to ‘fuel overall growth 
in the publishing industry’.3 In the UK, e-book sales and downloads accounted for 11 
per cent of the British book market in 2012 and this is expected to be higher in 2013.
4
 
The US and the UK could be said to be the world leaders regarding take-up of e-
books and e-book readers, as well as world leaders in the size of the market and 
growth.
5
 Australia trails the US and UK somewhat, but even here e-books are 
estimated to make up more than 10 per cent of the total book market, and this is also 
expected to grow.
6
 
The US and the UK have seen the emergence of Amazon as the dominant e-book 
and e-book reader provider. Amazon itself does not have an official presence in 
Australia, although it will ship some items to Australia, including certain versions of 
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its Kindle e-book reader,
7
 and also sells its Kindle via other retailers which already 
have a presence in Australia. Australians can buy e-books from Amazon’s online 
store but seem to experience a more restricted selection than their American or British 
counterparts.
8
 Despite these obstacles, Amazon is also the leading e-book and e-book 
device provider in Australia and is estimated to have a share of over 60 per cent of the 
market.
9
 
As mentioned above and discussed in more detail below, Amazon has emerged as 
the dominant e-book and device provider in at least the US and UK. In order to 
achieve this, Amazon has benefited from first-mover advantage, but also from 
network effects which characterise this market. The market for e-books is also two-
sided inasmuch as entities such as Amazon act as a platform connecting publishers 
and users through their online marketplaces as well as through selling devices on 
which to read the e-books. As the platform attracts more users, that platform becomes 
more attractive to publishers and authors since they have more users to whom to sell 
the e-books they produce, as well as being attractive for other publishers to join and 
existing publishers to add more content.
10
 Furthermore, DRM technologies are used in 
the distribution of e-books in order to prevent the copying of this digital content and 
so protect publishers’ content and source of profit. However, since the different e-
book platforms use different proprietary file formats and DRM, switching costs are 
increased for users, which can lock these users into a particular e-book ecosystem. 
Moreover, the largest platform may be the most attractive for users, given the greater 
amount of content it is likely to carry as well as the consumer perception that the 
largest platform carries the least risks (for example, the least risk of going bust or 
otherwise closing down) and thus it is the player least likely to exit the market.
11
 
Thus, network effects on both sides of this two-sided market encourage the 
concentration of players into large platforms. 
Nevertheless, the recent trend towards reading e-books on multi-functional 
devices would seem to have implications for neatly defining e-book markets. The 
market for e-books themselves can be defined, and is likely to continue to be defined 
as a separate market from ‘tangible’ books due to factors such as the requirement for 
some kind of devices on which the e-books can be read (contrasting with no such 
requirement for ‘tangible’ books). There may also be different markets for e-books in 
different formats. The most important formats are the open EPUB format (which does 
not work on Kindles) and the AZW/KF8 format (which is Amazon’s proprietary 
format and used on the Kindle device). Apple also has its own format, IBA, but 
supports EPUB as well. Regarding devices, it could be argued that there is a market 
for all devices that can read e-books (from dedicated e-book readers to laptop and 
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desktop computers) but it is submitted that separate markets should be defined, 
including a specific market for e-ink e-book readers. Apple does not provide specific 
devices primarily to read e-books (instead e-books can be read comfortably on its 
mobile devices, especially the iPad) and Amazon’s Kindle Fire is designed more as a 
multi-functional tablet device rather than a dedicated e-book reader, so mobile tablet 
devices may be defined as another market relevant to the discussion on e-books 
devices. It could also be argued that Amazon’s Kindles and Kindle e-books represent 
a market in themselves due to Amazon’s restrictive e-book format, which cannot be 
read on other, non-Amazon devices without breaking its DRM protection features. 
However, Amazon recently introduced a free Kindle app to facilitate the reading of 
Kindle books on non-Kindle devices (such as the iPad) and this may have 
implications for the market definition exercise since Kindle books can now be read on 
other devices. In addition, Amazon does not prevent the ‘side-loading’ of e-books 
acquired from different sources onto Amazon’s Kindle by using software to change 
the format from, for example, EPUB to AZW.   
Thus e-book markets are characterised by a lack of interoperability in some 
devices and some e-book formats at least, which can potentially lead to consumer 
lock-in in a particular ecosystem, most notably with the Kindle. Another recent trend 
is the move from device storage of e-books to cloud storage, which means that e-
books are not downloaded to the user’s device but instead read in the cloud. This is 
the case with Apple’s iBookstore and Amazon’s Kindle apps. Cloud storage can 
prove convenient because users can remotely access their data and it allows syncing 
between devices. However, there are the associated problems regarding surveillance, 
privacy and data protection as well as the private regulatory scheme created by the 
cloud owner, which can seemingly arbitrarily interfere with a user’s content. This can 
be seen by the various cases discussed below of users who have lost the content they 
purchased on Amazon due to Amazon deleting it, sometimes without any explanation 
and with no recourse for appeal by users. Furthermore, cloud storage can make it 
impossible for a user to download the files, and thus transfer them to another device 
of a competitor, preventing interoperability and possibly also competition. 
 
E-books, digital rights managements and the law 
 
As mentioned above, e-books and e-book devices often contain DRM measures which 
technically restrict what users can do with the devices and files. DRM measures are 
intended to protect copyright and prevent piracy by limiting the user’s ability to copy, 
lend or modify files and devices, but they also allow syncing between ‘approved’ 
devices. However, their practical application often goes much further than this 
purpose, for instance preventing interoperability of file formats and devices, or 
preventing the legal use of copyrighted works, such as fair dealing or copying for 
private or research purposes. DRM operates as an inflexible rule when copyright law 
actually creates a standard, and it cannot take into account the fact that users have 
legitimate motivations for moving a file from one device to another. With regards to 
e-books, DRM over devices such as Amazon’s Kindle ensures that the device’s 
software only permits the Amazon Kindle Store to be accessed on the device, and 
only permits certain file formats, including Amazon’s own e-book formats, to be read 
and others not to be read. Hackers have worked out technical measures to get around, 
remove or ‘break’ DRM but these are not necessarily legal even though they have at 
least a dual use: on the one hand they can be used to infringe copyright, but on the 
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other hand they can be used for legitimate reasons such as to facilitate 
interoperability. 
 
DRMs and the law 
 
The law on DRMs originally comes from art 11 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright 
Treaty,
12
 which calls for states to provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used 
by authors to protect their work (ie, DRM). The US, EU and Australia are all 
signatories to this treaty, and have transposed it into their domestic laws. 
In the US, the current version of art 11 is found in s 103 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (‘DMCA’),13 which makes it illegal to circumvent DRM measures, 
although it claims not to affect defences such as fair use. The Librarian of Congress 
issues exemptions to this rule, including an exemption for ‘jailbreaking’ smartphones 
but not tablets or e-books readers. In any event, it is at least a grey area as to whether 
breaking DRM to make a file or device interoperable is legal.
14
 
In the EU, it is art 6 of the Copyright Directive that transposes this provision and 
discusses Member States making available national exemptions or limitations in the 
absence of voluntary measures being taken by right holders.
15
 Of course, the 
Copyright Directive had to be transposed into the national legal systems of Member 
States, and so there are evidently differing implementations. For instance, the French 
implementation (known as the DADVSI law) criminalises DRM circumvention but 
allows an exemption for interoperability by obliging DRM system providers to 
provide the necessary technical documentation to any party needing it in order to 
ensure interoperability.
16
 This can be contrasted with the situation in the UK, where 
the implementing Regulations also criminalise DRM circumvention but permit 
individuals to complain to the Secretary of State if a technical device or measure 
prevents the carrying out of a ‘permitted act’, and the Secretary of State can in turn 
order the copyright owner to allow this.
17
 Here ‘permitted acts’ would seem to allow 
breaking DRM for some interoperability reasons, but not for private copying since 
there is currently no exception for this in English and Welsh domestic law. 
Nevertheless, the difference can be seen between the French law which guarantees 
DRM breaking for interoperability reasons and the British law which creates a 
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cumbersome administrative process in order to establish interoperability, thus in 
effect making it a grey area in the law. 
In Australia, the transposition of art 11 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty was 
originally introduced by a 2000 amendment to s 116 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
and updated subsequent to the 2004 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(‘FTA’).18 Article 17 of the FTA requires the parties to create liability for any person 
who circumvents without authority technological measures which control access to 
protected material, or who disseminates services that circumvent these measures (and 
these services have either only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other 
than to circumvent the technological measures, or they are primarily designed for the 
purpose of facilitating circumvention), with limited exceptions to these provisions 
such as for researchers who are trying to ensure the interoperability of computer 
programs and to investigate security flaws. These provisions of the treaty have been 
transposed into Australian law by the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), 
including the exception for interoperability in cases where the access control 
technological protection measures (‘TPMs’) are circumvented to enable an act which 
relates to a copy of a lawfully obtained computer program solely to achieve 
interoperability with an independently created computer program. The purpose of this 
part of the FTA was to bring Australian intellectual property law in line with that of 
the US, which it did do in terms of the restrictive measures, but not in terms of the 
protective measures for users, such as declining to introduce a ‘fair use’ exception 
into Australian law which would have theoretically given users more rights than the 
weaker ‘fair dealing’. Furthermore, the interoperability exception is very narrow, 
especially compared to the exceptions in European jurisdictions, and does not 
guarantee users the permission to break DRM measures in order to facilitate 
interoperability in all circumstances. 
 
The right of first sale in the digital realm 
 
E-books and their ownership have been caught up in the increasing move to the cloud, 
which is weakening any property rights users may try to assert over their e-books. 
With ‘tangible’ books, consumers in jurisdictions such as the US and EU have 
enjoyed the ‘doctrine of first sale’, where the property right in the tangible item 
passed from the retailer to the consumer and this allowed the consumer to lend the 
book to others or to sell the book second-hand, effectively ‘exhausting’ the right 
holder’s distribution right. Another party, most likely the publisher, would still retain 
the intellectual property rights over the ‘intangible’ content of the book that would for 
example limit the final consumer’s reproduction of the work, thus retaining 
possession of the reproduction right. 
However, this can be contrasted with the approach some e-book sellers, such as 
Amazon, are taking in claiming that there is no right of first sale with e-books since 
according to them the e-book is not actually ‘sold’, users merely pay for a ‘licence’ to 
read the e-book, which the e-book retailer enforces using DRM measures and cloud 
storage. Indeed, Amazon’s Kindle Store Terms of Use provide that e-books are 
licensed and not sold to the user, and that they are for the user’s ‘personal use’, thus 
implicitly asserting that the property right does not pass to the user so there is no right 
of first sale since the e-books are ‘licensed’ to the user via contract rather than sold. In 
                                                 
18
 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 18 May 2004 [2005] ATS 1 (entered into 
force 1 January 2005). 
 7 
this way, the e-book is not conceptualised as a ‘good’ like its tangible counterpart, but 
instead is a ‘service’ licensed by the retailer to the user to use in a more restricted way 
than if the user had bought a physical book.
19
 Thus when the user ‘buys’ the e-book, 
there is no exhaustion of the distribution right, so the user is not free to pass on the e-
book to others, etc. 
In practice, this conceptualisation of e-books as licensed services rather than sold 
goods has led to controversial situations in which Amazon has deleted e-books 
purchased by users from its own online bookstore or from one of the third party stores 
authorised to sell e-books to Kindles with no notification or permission sought from 
the user.
20
 
 
Europe: UsedSoft v Oracle 
 
Nevertheless, in the EU it seems that the provisions in Amazon’s Terms of Use which 
restrict what users can do with e-books can be subject to the external scrutiny of the 
law in determining whether the first sale doctrine applies in practice. This was the 
issue in the recent UsedSoft v Oracle decision of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (‘CJEU’),21 which concerned the marketing by UsedSoft of ‘used’ licences for 
Oracle’s databank software, which was usually distributed by direct download from 
Oracle’s website. The software’s licence agreement permitted the user to store the 
software permanently on a server and allow an additional 25 users to access and 
download the program, in addition to a non-exclusive, non-transferable right for an 
unlimited period to Oracle’s ‘maintenance’ of the software such as updates and 
patches. UsedSoft was re-selling licences for Oracle’s databank which it stated were 
still ‘current’ — ie, the maintenance agreement between Oracle and the initial user 
was still in force. Oracle managed to obtain a German court order to force UsedSoft to 
stop selling the ‘used’ licences since this infringed Oracle’s exclusive right of 
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permanent or temporary reproduction of computer programs, in contravention of art 4 
of the EU’s Software Directive.22 
When the case made it to the CJEU, the issue at stake was whether downloading a 
copy of a computer program from the internet exhausted the right of distribution of 
that copy in the EU. The court held that in the circumstances at hand, where the 
programs had been downloaded and the licences for those copies of the program 
encompassed the use of the program for an unlimited period of time, this constituted a 
first sale for the purposes of art 4 (2) of the Software Directive and it was irrelevant 
whether the program was downloaded from Oracle’s website or was, for example, 
obtained from an Oracle CD-ROM (thus via a tangible medium). The CJEU seemed 
to be wary of limiting the right of first sale to programs sold on a material medium, 
since this would give the copyright holder the ability to control the secondary market 
for the resale of the program and gain increased revenues with these further sales, and 
would also go beyond the necessary steps to protect the intellectual property at hand.
23
 
The effect of the decision in UsedSoft is also to hold that a right of first sale can 
exist in instances where customers have agreed to terms which formally claim this is a 
licence agreement in which re-sale is prohibited. Thus, even though for instance 
Amazon’s Kindle Store Terms of Use provide that e-books are licensed and not sold 
to the user, and that they are for the user’s ‘personal use’, it could be argued by 
analogy that the UsedSoft case also covers e-books and that the right of first sale 
applies to them too, and it matters not that Amazon claims they are merely ‘licensed’. 
Nevertheless, there are issues around the consistency of the CJEU’s lack of 
distinction between downloading a program and obtaining the same program via a 
physical medium for the purposes of the first sale doctrine’s application, with the 
notion of a ‘copy’ from arts 6–7 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty,24 which give 
contracting parties the freedom to determine the conditions of the exhaustion of the 
right of distribution after first sale, and give authors of inter alia computer programs 
the exclusive right to authorise commercial rental of originals or copies of their work, 
respectively. 
Consistency with the WIPO Copyright Treaty aside, there are other impediments 
to the broader application of the decision in UsedSoft to e-books and other kinds of 
digital content in the EU. Whether e-books are defined as products or services is 
crucial in the EU since, if they are ‘services’, then recital 29 of the Copyright 
Directive provides that ‘the question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of 
services and on-line services in particular … every on-line service is an act which 
should be subject to authorisation where the copyright or related right so provides’. 
Furthermore, the CJEU in UsedSoft relied on provisions of the Software Directive, 
specifically applicable to computer programs, the equivalents of which are lacking in 
the Copyright Directive. 
In any event, this question has recently been considered by the German Regional 
Court of Bielefeld, which held that the CJEU’s decision in UsedSoft did not apply to 
the re-sale of other kinds of digital content including e-books.
25
 The case concerned a 
                                                 
22
 Council Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs [2009] 
OJ L 111/16 (‘Software Directive’). 
23
 Eleonora Rosati, ‘Exhaustion Also Applies to the First Sale of Downloaded Software’ (2012) 7(11) 
Journal of Intellectual Property and Practice 786. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Landgericht Bielefeld [Bielefeld Regional Court], 4 O 191/11, 5 March 2013. See Emma Linklater, 
‘E-books Distinguished from Software, Not Exhausted’ (2013) 8(9) Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law and Practice 685. 
 9 
retailer which operated a website selling inter alia books in both ‘physical’ and digital 
formats, whose terms and conditions for sale provided that the user acquired a non-
transferable right to use the content for personal use only, and which restricted the 
users’ ability to copy, transfer or resell the downloaded content, presumably with 
DRM measures. These business practices were challenged by a German consumer 
rights organisation, which relied on the UsedSoft decision to argue that exhaustion 
should apply to tangible and intangible content in the same way. However the German 
court dismissed these claims, and distinguished UsedSoft from the case at hand since 
the Software Directive only applied to computer programs and did not apply to 
scenarios involving other kinds of digital content. 
In any event, the trend to move content such as e-books to the cloud may further 
weaken attempts to apply the decision in UsedSoft to digital content such as e-books, 
since here the e-books are not downloaded to a user’s device, and so the argument that 
they are ‘services’ rather than ‘products’ is strengthened. Besides, even if in the 
increasingly unlikely event the decision in UsedSoft will be applied to other types of 
digital content, the retailers of that digital content will just move it entirely to the 
cloud so that it is conceptualised as a service, with the effect that it will be more 
difficult to argue that ownership has passed to the user. 
 
United States: Vernor and ReDigi 
 
In the US, a similar scenario to that in UsedSoft was considered by the 9
th
 Circuit 
Court of Appeal in Vernor v Autodesk,
26
 but there it was found that the doctrine of 
first sale did not apply to software sold for a fixed price for an unlimited period under 
a licence proclaiming that no property right passed on the sale, and it could not be re-
sold.
27
 Here the Court of Appeal found that ownership of the software had not passed 
on the initial sale since the software had been ‘licensed’ rather than ‘sold’, and so it 
was the licence agreement that governed the relationship between the retailer and 
customer. Halpern et al note that, while not addressed explicitly by the Court, the first 
sale doctrine is based on there being a transfer of a single copy of the work, such as 
handing a ‘physical’ book or compact disc from one person to another, while in the 
case at hand, the original purchaser of the software on-sold an older version of the 
software after upgrading to a new version and so ‘enabled the simultaneous existence 
of two copies of the software’, a set of circumstances not readily possible in the pre-
digital world.
28
 
This has been followed by a United States District Court in the recent Capitol 
Records v ReDigi case, where it was held that digital music files which were 
originally lawfully purchased from the iTunes store could not be re-sold by the user 
who purchased them on ReDigi’s online marketplace under the first sale doctrine.29 
Although ReDigi employed a cloud service which verified whether the uploaded files 
were originally lawfully purchased from a verified source and deleted any other 
copies of the file on the user’s computer, and so the music file was effectively 
transferred from one user to another without a copy being left with the original user, 
the court held that Capitol Records’ reproduction right was infringed because the files 
exchanged via ReDigi were not ‘lawfully made’ since reproduction of the file 
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occurred when files were moved from one user’s computer to another, and it was 
irrelevant that the original file was deleted once this had happened — the fact a copy 
had been made was the important element. In addition, Capitol Records’ distribution 
right was also infringed when a file was uploaded or downloaded from ReDigi’s 
cloud service since these actions did not involve the transfer of the original file but a 
copy of that file. While this outcome, though a technically accurate application of the 
law to the process of selling a file through ReDigi given the temporary copies made of 
the file, does seem to lead to the impossibility of the creation of secondary markets for 
digital content independent of the original copyright owners of that content and 
associated issues for competition in such markets (such as the leveraging of a 
dominant position into a secondary market). However, it seems that the Court of 
Appeal’s decision was also influenced by considerations of its role in the context of 
the separation of powers, since it considered that it was for Congress to amend the 
DMCA provisions concerning the first sale doctrine for digital content, and not the 
place of the court. Even if Congress did take action on this point, Saunders considers 
that right holders may try to avoid the first sale doctrine by terming the transfer of 
content a licence agreement to which the first sale doctrine does not apply.
30
 
An interesting development which may also contribute to making secondary 
markets beyond the control of the original right holder impossible is the proposal to 
include the making of temporary copies of copyrighted works illegal, contained 
within the most recently leaked text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
currently under negotiation among various Pacific Rim countries including Australia 
and the US.
31
 According to the text leaked in 2011, art 4 on ‘copyright and related 
rights’ would prohibit making temporary copies of copyrighted material, including 
temporary storage in electronic form. This has so far attracted attention for potentially 
making the everyday conduct of millions of web users illegal due to the fact that web 
browsers make temporary copies, sometimes of copyrighted material, called ‘caches’, 
in their normal functioning.
32
 However, it would seem to have ramifications too for 
services such as ReDigi which make temporary copies (or at least whose service 
creates the temporary scenario of two copies co-existing) in the course of their 
functioning. 
The decision in UsedSoft notwithstanding, it seems that the first sale doctrine is 
unlikely to apply to digital content (reinforced by the decision in ReDigi), with the 
exception of software in Europe which is governed by its own legal regime. The trend 
of the move to the cloud exacerbates the licence/sale distinction, with it becoming 
increasingly logical that content be obtained via contractual licences rather than a sale 
transferring the property right. Thus the first sale doctrine will not apply to digital 
content and there is no exhaustion of the right holders’ right of distribution, allowing 
them to control the content in a way they were unable practically and legally to do 
with ‘tangible’ content. Accordingly, uses of DRM by Amazon and others to control 
e-books beyond their initial ‘purchase’ would seem to be legitimate inasmuch as the 
right of first sale does not apply, even if this is highly restrictive of the user. 
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Problems with e-book readers 
 
The practice so far with e-book readers has raised various problems in relation to the 
user experience. Firstly, there is the emergence of Amazon as a market leader in e-
book markets due to its first mover advantage and its controlling behaviour regarding 
users’ freedom and e-book format interoperability. 
 
Amazon’s dominance? 
 
Amazon operates in various parts of the e-book value chain. Upstream, it is a 
technology provider by selling its e-book reading device, the Kindle; downstream, it 
operates the online bookstore through which it sells Kindle-formatted e-books. 
Amazon is also a publisher, and through its ‘Kindle Direct Publishing’ initiative it 
acts as a self-publishing platform for authors to sell their e-books through its Kindle 
store. It is considered to be a dominant entity in e-book retailing markets at least in 
the US, where it commands around 60 per cent of the market share.
33
 In the UK, 
Amazon is considered to have an e-book market share of 90 per cent,
34
 but it is not 
active in every EU Member State, and in some territories in which it does operate, it is 
not the dominant entity. The market for e-books in continental Europe is less 
developed than that in the UK and US, with a much smaller proportion of the 
population owning an e-book reading device and buying e-books.
35
 
Another relevant market for Amazon would be that of e-book devices. As 
mentioned above, this market or markets could be defined in various ways. If the 
relevant market is that for tablet devices, then Amazon’s Kindle Fire does not have a 
dominant market share. In the US its market share at the time of writing was 37 per 
cent of the tablet market.
36
 In the EU, the Kindle Fire is only available for sale in the 
UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. It seems that the iPad is still the leading tablet 
computer in Europe, and the Kindle Fire is definitely not a dominant player in that 
market. However, if it is the market for e-ink e-book devices that is relevant here, then 
Amazon has around a 50 per cent share of the US market. It is unclear whether 
Amazon would be the dominant player in the European market for e-ink e-book 
readers, but it seems to be the market leader (possibly with a dominant position) in the 
UK market for one. 
Amazon managed to achieve its leading position in e-book and e-book device 
markets through its first mover advantage as discussed above, and also through 
attracting users to its Kindle ecosystem. One of the ways in which it has done this is 
to sell the Kindle devices very cheaply, at a price at which it breaks even or even 
makes a small loss. Once users have a Kindle though, they are locked in to Amazon’s 
Kindle Store since that is the only one available on their device and their device can 
only read Amazon’s format of e-books, so Amazon can make money on selling (or 
more accurately ‘licensing’) digital content. Amazon initially sold e-books at low 
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prices, but later came up against resistance from publishers, leading to Amazon finally 
adopting the agency model (discussed below). However, Amazon is increasingly 
becoming a publisher itself, with authors self-publishing through Amazon, and this is 
becoming an important revenue stream, especially in the wake of the commercial 
success of originally self-published e-books such as Fifty Shades of Grey. Amazon 
keeps 30 per cent of the revenues of books self-published through Kindle, and has 
also opened its own publishing imprint which produces both e-books and paper 
versions. 
Nevertheless, cheap devices and cheap e-books come at a price for Amazon’s 
users. In order to preserve this dominant position, Amazon has limited interoperability 
of device and e-book formats and has a high level of control over what users can do in 
these markets. Firstly, as mentioned above, Amazon’s Kindle can only read e-books 
formatted in its particular proprietary format or other formats approved by Amazon. 
Approved formats include PDFs, yet PDFs are not technically an e-book format and it 
is further submitted that PDFs are not substitutable for e-books due to not being easily 
‘reflowable’ (ie, PDFs do not adapt well to different sizes of displays and devices, 
especially those with smaller screen such as e-book readers). Other e-book formats 
such as the open and popular EPUB can be converted to Amazon’s format so that they 
can be read on the Kindle but this is a somewhat awkward process, and certainly it is 
much easier for users (especially those with less technical knowledge) just to buy the 
e-book in Amazon’s format from the Amazon website. Indeed, there is a tendency for 
consumers to use technology providers’ ‘storefronts’ to purchase content even if there 
are alternative sources of the same content.
37
 Furthermore, even customers who 
convert books from other formats to be compatible with the Kindle may find that their 
converted book does not display properly or displays only partially. In any event, this 
causes user lock-in to this particular format, and this, as well as the move to the cloud, 
limits the portability of their data, such as putting the e-books onto a different device. 
This could also be seen as anti-competitive since it uses the fact that the user has 
already acquired Amazon’s device to force them to buy e-books from Amazon, thus 
giving Amazon full control over the process. 
Amazon’s control over the process could have similar ‘non-economic’ 
consequences such as censoring the content available to users, and not allowing the 
sale of a certain e-book because it is critical of Amazon (ie, content that is not illegal 
but damaging to Amazon’s brand). In fact, Amazon operates as a private regulator of 
content — for instance, it has Content Guidelines for the Kindle Direct Publishing 
scheme in which it bans pornography, ‘offensive’ content or ‘books that provide a 
poor customer experience’ (all of which may constitute legal content).38 Furthermore, 
it has removed erotic literature from its Kindle Store,
39
 and previously removed 57 
000 gay and lesbian themed books from its sales ranking and search algorithms — 
although these books were still available for sale, they were no longer visible in 
recommendations or search results.
40
 In addition, Amazon’s practice of interfering 
with users’ accounts without their permission could allow it to delete such content 
                                                 
37
 Linklater, ‘A European Perspective’, above n 19, 24–25. 
38
 Kindle Direct Publishing, Content Guidelines <https://kdp.amazon.com/self-
publishing/help?topicId=A3KIRDTX1UQJX0>.  
39
 Chris Meadows, Amazon Removes Incest-Related Erotica Titles from Store, Kindle Archive (12 
December 2010) TeleRead <www.teleread.com/ebooks/amazon-removes-incest-related-erotica-titles-
from-store-kindle-archive/>. 
40
 Andrea James, AmazonFail: an Inside Look at What Happened (13 April 2009) Seattle Pi 
<http://blog.seattlepi.com/amazon/2009/04/13/amazonfail-an-inside-look-at-what-happened/>.  
 13 
even if the user converts, for instance, an EPUB version acquired from a source 
beyond Amazon to Amazon’s proprietary format and places it on her Wi-Fi enabled 
Kindle. 
Secondly, Amazon is also able to exert much more control over what users can do 
with their e-books than traditional booksellers and publishers, since, as mentioned 
above, unlike their physical/tangible counterparts, Amazon does not consider e-books 
to be a ‘good’ and instead has conceptualised them as a digital ‘service’ such that the 
property right does not pass from the e-book retailer to the user on its purchase, and 
instead is sold as a licence from the retailer to the user.
41
 Amazon has claimed that 
there is no ‘right of first sale’ with its e-books, and that thus they are not actually 
purchased by the customer with the property right over the book passing to the 
customer as in the case of physical books, but are merely licensed by Amazon. 
Amazon also limits the sharing and lending of e-books in Amazon’s proprietary 
format by the customer — the customer can only do this with other devices registered 
to the same Amazon account. 
Interestingly, in early 2013 Amazon was awarded a patent in the US concerning a 
‘secondary market for digital objects’, which would seem to mean a system through 
which users could sell, trade or loan digital objects such as music files, films, apps 
and, of course, e-books.
42
 However, part of the patent seems to permit Amazon to 
introduce scarcity, such as limiting the amount of times a particular object can be 
transferred, and once transferred, removing that object from linked devices, hard 
drives, etc. In addition, given the decision discussed above in the ReDigi case which 
seems to prevent third parties from selling up digital ‘secondary markets’ without 
specific authorisation from the copyright holders, there are competition concerns 
about the increased control over more parts of the value chain Amazon would have 
once these digital ‘marketplaces’ are set up and in operation. 
 
Apple and the book publishers 
 
Similar to Amazon, Apple functions as a vertically integrated provider in the e-book 
markets — it provides devices in the form of the iPad, iPhone and iPod Touch and 
also the online retail distribution platform in the form of the iBookstore app. Unlike 
Amazon, Apple mainly uses the open EPUB format for the e-books it sells, although 
it also has a proprietary format in the form of IBA used with the iBook Author app 
(which is a self-publishing application), yet still permits various other formats to be 
read on Apple devices such as PDFs (as mentioned above though, PDFs are not an e-
book format). 
Nevertheless, Apple device users can also purchase or otherwise obtain books 
beyond the iBookstore and, given the use of open formats, this is an easier process 
than with Amazon’s Kindle where e-books obtained from beyond the official retailing 
channels must be converted into Amazon’s proprietary e-book format. Indeed, 
Amazon has a free Kindle app which is available through the Apple App Store and 
allows users to read and access Kindle books across devices from the same account. 
However, outside reading in-app, device users must upload all content to Apple’s 
distribution platforms, and Apple has tried to ensure that if its device users buy e-
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books from other sources, they are not paying less than they would do if they bought 
them via the iBookstore. 
In order to ensure its users were not able to obtain e-books elsewhere for less than 
the iBookstore was charging, Apple entered into ‘agency’ agreements with five of the 
major ‘Big Six’ book publishers (namely HarperCollins, Hachette, Simon & Schuster, 
Penguin and Macmillan) in 2010, which gave the publishers more control over retail 
prices. Previously, the ‘wholesale’ model had been adopted for e-books, which is 
more common in ‘tangible’ book markets. This model typically involved a 
‘recommended retail price’ being set, with publishers charging retailers around half of 
that price and then retailers free to discount the books if they wanted. The agency 
model, however, involved Apple being designated as the ‘agent’ of the publishers, 
giving the publishers more control over setting the final retail price. In these particular 
agreements Apple took 30 per cent of the final price, with the publishers retaining 70 
per cent. Evidently this agreement was advantageous for the publishers who ended up 
with roughly 20 per cent more from e-book sales than they had under the wholesale 
model. All of the contracts between Apple and the publishers contained the same key 
terms regarding the agency model, as well as a ‘Most Favored Nation’ (‘MFN’) 
clause which stipulated that the publishers were not permitted to let their e-books be 
sold elsewhere for less than Apple’s price for them. 
Practice has shown that once publishers opt for the agency model with one 
retailer, they will move to this model with other retailers, and indeed later in 2010 
they moved to this model with Amazon as well.
43
 In addition, Apple has already used 
this agency model for sales of music through its iTunes service. It was alleged that 
prices for e-books rose 30 per cent as a result of these agency contracts. However, the 
argument in justification of Apple and the publishers’ behaviour was that Amazon had 
been charging ‘unsustainably’ low prices for e-books, and that these agency contracts 
were necessary to provide competition to Amazon’s retail monopoly.44 
 
E-books and competition law 
 
The scenarios outlined above in the previous section raise various competition issues 
including potential abuses of Amazon’s dominant position and price-fixing among the 
‘Big Six’ publishers and the distributions platforms offered by Apple and Amazon. 
Indeed, these issues have been the subject of competition investigations into Apple 
and five of the ‘Big Six’ publishers for this alleged price-fixing in both the US and 
EU, and a recent antitrust suit against Amazon and the Big Six in the US by 
independent publishers for alleged monopolisation of the US e-books market based on 
their use of proprietary DRM in the e-books and Kindle devices. 
 
Apple’s price-fixing 
 
European Union 
 
The European Commission started its investigation into Apple and the book 
publishers for alleged price-fixing in December 2011 due to concerns that the change 
from the wholesale to agency contracts may have constituted illegal agreements 
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among the parties, breaching EU competition law by restricting competition, in turn 
breaching art 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
45
 which 
prohibits cartels and restrictive business practices.
46
 The European Commission was 
concerned that the change to agency contracts may have been the result of collusion 
between competing publishers with Apple’s help, and may have had as their goal the 
increase of e-book retail prices or the prevention of the emergence of lower prices for 
consumers. 
Four of the publishers and Apple offered commitments to the European 
Commission in September 2012, which the latter accepted in December 2012.
47
 The 
commitments entail that Apple and the publishers would terminate the existing 
agency agreements and not adopt MFN clauses (regarding not selling books cheaper 
than the price for which they were sold to Apple) for five years, and if the publishers 
did enter into agency agreements again then the retailers would be free to set the retail 
price of e-books for two years up to an amount equal to the commission the retailer 
receives from the publisher over a one-year period.
48 
Apple also committed not to 
enter into or enforce any retail price MFN clauses they may have in any new or 
existing agency agreements for a period of five years. Penguin, which was the only 
party in Europe not to have settled, offered substantially similar commitments to the 
European Commission in April 2013,
49
 which were ‘market tested’ and finally 
accepted by the Commission in July 2013.
50
 
 
United States investigation 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the US Department of Justice (‘DoJ’) opened its 
investigation into Apple and the publishers, and filed a civil antitrust suit against them 
in the New York District Court in April 2012, alleging that they had violated s 1 of 
the Sherman Act prohibiting cartels.
51
 
Four of the publishers opted to settle with the DoJ under similar terms as the 
European agreements.
52 
The fifth publisher (Macmillan) settled subsequent to them 
and, aside from the other requirements, agreed to allow immediate discounting of its 
books by retailers, provide advance notification to the DoJ of any e-book ventures it 
                                                 
45
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 
13 December 2007, [2008] OJ C 115/01 (entered into force 1 December 2009).  
46
 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Proceedings to Investigate Sale of E-
books’ (Press Release, 6 December 2011).  
47
 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Accepts Legally Binding Commitments from Simon 
& Schuster, Harper Collins, Hachette, Holtzbrink and Apple for Sale of E-books’ (Press Release, 13 
December 2012). Parties subject to competition investigations by the European Commission have a 
large incentive to offer these commitments and so ‘settle’ the case since, if the Commission accepts 
them, it does not proceed to a full investigation. If the Commission does conduct a full investigation 
and finds the parties in breach of EU competition law, it can impose fines of up to 10 per cent of a 
party’s global turnover, which can be a very significant amount of money, running into billions of 
Euros. 
48
 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Accepts Legally Binding Commitments’, above n 
47.  
49
 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Market Tests Commitments Proposed by Penguin 
for the Sale of E-books’ (Press Release, 19 April 2013). 
50
 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Accepts Legally Binding Commitments’, above n 
47.  
51
 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 USC §§ 1–7 (1890) (‘Sherman Act’). 
52
 Karen Haslam, Penguin Abandons Apple in Anti-Monopoly Book Fight with US DOJ (20 December 
2012) Macworld <www.macworld.com.au/news/penguin-abandons-apple-in-anti-monopoly-book-
fight-with-us-doj-83226/>. 
 16 
plans to undertake jointly with other publishers, and report regularly to the DoJ on 
any communications it has with other publishers.
53 
Macmillan’s digital textbooks are 
exempt from this settlement since the DoJ case only involved trade books.
54
 
Apple, however, opted not to settle and instead went to trial, with the District 
Court judge holding that Apple had violated s 1 of the Sherman Act in July 2013, 
finding direct and circumstantial evidence that Apple had conspired with the 
publishers to eliminate retail price competition and to raise the price of e-books.
55
 
In its defence, Apple had argued that its conduct was actually pro-competitive and 
created a ‘healthier market’ for e-books. Accordingly, it contended that its conduct be 
assessed according to the ‘rule of reason’, which involves the pro-competitive effects 
being weighed up against the anti-competitive effects of the conduct, rather than be 
treated as a ‘per se’ violation of the antitrust rules, which, as the name suggests, does 
not involve a consideration of pro-competitive effects.  Apple did not explain very 
clearly in the trial what these pro-competitive effects were, but the judge suggested 
that they involved Apple launching the iBookstore to compete with Amazon’s 
dominant Kindle store, and combining with the publishers to deprive Amazon of 
some of its market power.
56
 
The judge found that given the evidence, Apple’s conduct was illegal and in 
breach of the Sherman Act whether judged under a ‘rule of reason’ analysis or under a 
‘per se’ analysis, yet it was a per se violation of the Sherman Act since Apple had 
participated in and facilitated the horizontal price-fixing conspiracy among the 
publishers. Furthermore, she found that Apple had not shown any pro-competitive 
effects flowing from the agreements with the publishers. The agreements limited the 
ability of the retailers to set e-book prices, ensured that Apple did not need to compete 
on price and allowed the publishers to raise the price of e-books which in practice 
they did.
57
 So for consumers Apple’s entry into the e-book market brought less 
competition on price and in fact higher prices for e-books.
58
 
Prior to the trial, there had been claims from some quarters that Amazon had been 
engaging in predatory pricing tactics in order to secure its dominance in the e-book 
market,
59
 which meant that other retailers were unable to compete in the marketplace 
on the basis of price, so eliminating price competition was the only way to level the 
playing field and fight back against Amazon’s ‘winner takes all’ business strategy. 
However, the judge found that Apple engaging in price-fixing conduct with the 
publishers was not the appropriate response to any unfair trade practices by Amazon 
— instead, Apple should have lodged a complaint with the appropriate law 
enforcement agency or filed a civil suit.
60
 Moreover, the judge found that it was 
‘doubtful’ that the only way that Apple could have entered the e-book market (and 
thus provide competition for Amazon) was to enter these agreements with the 
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publishers to raise e-book prices, especially given the fact that Apple has entered 
many new content markets.
61
 
The DoJ has proposed a remedy to Apple’s illegal conduct that would involve 
Apple terminating the agency contracts with the publishers and not entering into any 
agreements for the next five years that would prevent Apple from competing on 
price.
62
 In addition, the proposed remedy affects Apple’s relationships beyond the e-
book market, and prohibits Apple from entering into agreements with the suppliers of 
other content such as music and videos ‘that are likely to increase the prices at which 
Apple’s competitor retailers may sell that content’.63  Furthermore, the DoJ proposes 
that for two years Apple must allow other e-book retailers such as Amazon and 
Barnes & Noble to provide links from their e-book apps to their e-bookstores, to 
allow users to compare Apple’s prices with its competitors’. 
At the time of writing, Apple opposes the DoJ’s proposed settlement, and the trial 
to decide what damages Apple must pay is due to occur in May 2014. 
 
Analysis 
 
In these proceedings, Apple’s behaviour is interesting inasmuch as it agreed to a 
settlement with the European Commission but refused to settle with the American 
DoJ, instead going to a full trial which it has lost at the first instance by being found 
guilty of engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. Why Apple pursued this trajectory 
is unclear — it is perhaps to do with the greater incentives to settle in the EU or 
differences in the dynamics of e-book markets on the two sides of the Atlantic (for 
example, Apple operates in more EU states than Amazon does). 
Apple and the publishers’ price-fixing as well as the legal aftermath raise various 
points. Firstly, as is explicit in the US District Court judge’s decision and implicit 
from the settlements, the process of competition and the consumer’s welfare are to be 
protected, rather than the position of competitors. The US decision reiterates the 
antitrust laws are enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors’.64 
Certainly for users high book prices are undesirable. Furthermore, despite claims that 
these agreements were necessary to challenge Amazon, in practice Apple seems to 
have been gaining market share regardless.
65
 
These were also not the appropriate processes by which to counter any predatory 
pricing behaviour engaged in by Amazon. The US District Court decision in 
particular condemns the ‘self help’ methods which Apple and the publishers turned to; 
if they had these concerns, they should have been addressed through formal legal 
means, not by engaging in price-fixing. Besides, the US DoJ has investigated Amazon 
for alleged predatory pricing but seemingly did not find that Amazon engaged in that 
conduct. Amazon has been selling e-books ‘below cost’ but predatory pricing requires 
evidence that Amazon was doing this in an exclusionary fashion with a view to 
increase prices (‘recoupment’) once it had squeezed competitors out of the market. 
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This evidence seemingly was not found — in general, predatory pricing is difficult to 
prove. 
In the US at least, the outcome of these events may have implications beyond 
Apple’s pricing of e-books, especially if the DoJ’s remedy is followed and enforced. 
Indeed, similar aspects of the model Apple used to contract with the book publishers 
are found in Apple’s contracts with other entities selling through its App Store, 
including newspaper publishers and software developers, such as a 30 per cent cut for 
Apple. Previously Apple has wanted an assurance that the other party will not sell its 
wares elsewhere for a price lower than that which it offers via the Apple App Store 
(although it seems that it no longer enforces this requirement),
66
 and it has ensured 
that the other party does not include signups for paid services to be accessible directly 
in the app other than those available through the In App Purchase (which must abide 
by Apple’s pricing rules). The DoJ’s proposal is significant since it would prohibit 
Apple from entering into agreements with the suppliers of other content (such as 
music and videos) that include, for instance, MFN clauses — such MFN clauses 
effectively mean the prices of this content being sold through other outlets are driven 
up as a result of the agreement with Apple, resulting in higher prices for users. This 
would not prevent, for instance, Apple continuing to receive a 30 per cent cut of 
revenue, but it may avert the move to agency contracts in other content sectors and 
encourage lower prices and more competition among content retailers, which in this 
case is good for users. 
Furthermore, the DoJ’s proposal would affect Apple’s In-App Purchase rules. 
Those rules require third party app providers to provide Apple with 30 per cent of 
revenue. If these third parties do not wish to follow these rules, they can opt to sell 
content at their own prices through their websites, accessible via the iPad and iPhone 
browsers, or even create a ‘web app’ in HTML5, which is what the Financial Times 
preferred to maintaining an Apple App Store app. So although parties have options to 
navigate around Apple’s rules, they are less convenient for the user. If Apple is 
obliged to allow other e-book retailers to provide direct links from their e-book apps 
to their e-bookstores, then this would be a change to Apple’s current practice. 
In any event, the consequences of the settlements and Apple’s trial will be 
interesting for the dynamics of the traditional publishing industry. Indeed, a reduction 
in the price of e-books was observed very soon after the previous settlements were 
reached.
67
 However, it would seem that e-books are still being priced well above their 
‘marginal cost’ and priced in a way similar to ‘tangible’ books, even though evidently 
less raw materials are required to make an e-book compared to a paper or hardback. 
The extent to which the traditional publishing industry is really necessary is certainly 
a topic for debate, given the fact that the internet and digital technologies make it 
possible for authors to write their own material and directly publish and market it for 
little or minimal cost, in a similar way in which musicians can now bypass record 
labels. Nevertheless, traditionally there has been a stigma attached to self-publication, 
inasmuch as authors only do this if they have ‘failed’ to get an established 
publisher/agent to take on their work, and individuals are unlikely to have access to 
the same resources as publishing houses (in terms of marketing, legal expertise, 
editors, etc) or have the institutional relationships those publishing houses have with 
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newspapers, educational establishments, libraries, etc. Then again, similar 
relationships between music record labels and the corresponding institutions did not 
prevent music released outside these channels from becoming popular and selling 
well. In addition, the preserve of competition law is not to prop up legacy business 
models, which is another reason why these price-fixing agreements should not be 
permitted. 
 
Amazon, dominance and DRM 
 
After deflecting accusations of anticompetitive conduct in the DoJ and European 
Commission investigations, Amazon is itself now the subject of a class action in 
antitrust in the US filed by various independent booksellers against it and all of the 
‘Big Six’ book publishers (ie, Random House, Penguin, Hachette, Simon & Schuster, 
HarperCollins and Macmillan).
68
 The complaint claims that Amazon and the 
publishers violated the Sherman Act by entering into agreements (which have not 
been made public) to distribute e-books via the Kindle which permitted Amazon to 
use DRM to restrict these e-books from being read on devices other than the Kindle or 
without a Kindle app, with this also being an illegal restraint of trade. Furthermore, 
Amazon has been accused of monopolisation and attempted monopolisation, and the 
plaintiffs complain of Amazon’s unwillingness to enter into agreements with 
independent bookstores or collectives. 
The suit has been criticised for the plaintiffs’ inaccurate use of ‘open source’ and 
failure to understand how DRM works,
69
 especially since their actual complaint seems 
to be about the prohibitive cost of creative/licensing and maintaining a DRM system 
effectively,
70
 rather than getting rid of DRM altogether (since if this happened, users 
would be able to copy and distribute e-books as they wanted, and so presumably 
revenue for book publishers, e-book sellers, and device manufacturers would 
collapse). Furthermore, if an ‘open source’ DRM was used, then users would be able 
to modify the source code in order to get around the rights protection and then copy 
and distribute the material as they wished. 
From a user’s point of view, as mentioned above, the problem of DRM is 
exacerbated by the fact that, in the US under s 103 of the DMCA, it is illegal to 
‘break’ DRM and it is not clear whether this also covers breaking DRM for purposes 
which are not to infringe copyright (such as for the purpose of interoperability). 
However, the publishers are likely to argue that some kind of DRM on the e-books is 
necessary to protect their intellectual property rights, yet whether they require DRM 
measures which also take the form of Amazon’s proprietary e-book format may be 
seen to go beyond what is necessary to ensure the right is protected, especially since 
the right to be protected is not Amazon’s. 
 
Is Amazon abusing its dominant position? 
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Firstly, the relevant markets must be ascertained. As discussed above, in the US 
Amazon appears to be the market leader in the markets for e-ink e-book devices (50 
per cent share) and e-books (60 per cent share). However, these may not constitute a 
dominant position in these markets under US law. Assuming that the 60 per cent share 
of the e-book market can be characterised as a dominant position in that market, then 
the argument against Amazon would be that it is abusing this dominant position by 
tying its e-book store to Kindle devices, thus leveraging its power from being the 
dominant player in the market for e-books into the market for e-book devices. 
In the US, to find abusive tying requires that the products normally form separate 
product markets and that the customer is prevented/disincentivised from purchasing 
the goods separately, as well as the tying conduct being an exclusionary practice from 
a dominant firm.
71
 It would have to be shown that the effect of the tying of Amazon’s 
Kindle book format to its devices is exclusionary of competitors and harmful for 
consumers. 
However, since Amazon has launched the free Kindle app for other devices, 
especially Apple’s iPad and devices running Google’s Android operating system, 
Amazon would argue that now e-books purchased from its store can be read on many 
devices, including ones not operated by Amazon, and perhaps could also argue that 
there are no longer separate markets, especially with the e-books being increasingly 
stored in the cloud rather than on the device, and the app facilitating syncing among 
all of the user’s devices so that the e-books can be read on any one of them, and thus 
the user can pick up where she last left off even when that was on a different device. 
Furthermore, this general trend of moving content to the cloud and decline in the sales 
of dedicated e-book readers may support Amazon’s argument that e-books and the 
software that facilitates their reading are no longer distinguishable markets. In 
addition, on non-Amazon devices where there are Kindle apps, there are also 
competing e-bookstore apps such as Apple’s iBookstore so users have a choice of 
different vendors or sources from which to buy and read e-books (albeit currently 
subject to Apple’s pricing rules). 
If the markets for e-books and devices/apps can be considered separate, then there 
would be a strong argument that they are tied since it is impossible to purchase Kindle 
e-books without using a Kindle device or app to read them and vice versa, unless the 
DRM on either the book or device is broken. However, with Amazon’s launch of the 
e-book app, its Kindle e-books can now ‘legitimately’ be read on other devices, so 
this tying does not exclude Amazon’s competitors in the device market. Furthermore, 
Amazon does not exclude e-books purchased from other sources being put on its 
devices so long as they are converted to Amazon’s e-book format, so this tying is not 
necessarily exclusionary of competitors in the e-book market. 
It is submitted that this conduct may well not be found as an abuse of a dominant 
position through tying since the exclusionary nature of the conduct for competitors 
and the harm to consumers will not be sufficiently shown. However, even though 
users have a choice between different devices on which to read Kindle e-books and 
can read converted books purchased elsewhere on their Kindles, the issue of 
interoperability is not fully dealt with by such a competition analysis. Users will still 
not be able to legitimately move their Kindle formatted books off their Kindle device 
or app since this would involve breaking DRM and thus may well be illegal in the US. 
Nevertheless, perhaps if it can be found that converted files are corrupted and/or do 
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not display well to the extent that they are more or less useless, and Amazon is 
responsible for this, then it may be claimed that in practice users cannot obtain the 
tied product elsewhere and so they cannot obtain the tying product without the tied 
product. 
It seems that should a similar case arise in Europe, the tying rules would lead to a 
similar result, although DRM breaking for non-copyright infringing reasons seems 
more ‘legal’ there as discussed above. 
This would not help the independent bookstores in the US antitrust complaint, 
since they wish to be included as sellers presumably in competition with Amazon’s 
own bookstore for providing books to Kindle devices. If especially it can be shown 
that users can currently obtain these books elsewhere, or that these booksellers could 
sell their books in an open format that users can then subsequently convert into 
Amazon-friendly files, then this would not fulfil the conditions for tying as an abuse 
of a dominant position. 
 
Are the publishers unfairly restraining trade? 
 
The contention here would be that the Big Six publishers are unfairly restraining trade 
and competition by insisting on the use of DRM for e-books, with the consequence 
that only major outlets such as Amazon with its deep pockets can afford the 
implementation and maintenance of this technology. 
If this case were to be heard before a European court, then agreements there must 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. 
Here it seems the object of the insistence on using DRM for e-books from the 
publishers’ perspective are to protect copyright and thus their revenue streams, so 
DRM is in essence a form of upstream protection. From Amazon’s perspective, the 
use of DRM also allows it to preserve/increase its market share. The effect of the 
agreements to use DRM and especially in a way which means that the e-books are 
sold in Amazon’s proprietary format does have the effect of foreclosing the market 
for selling e-books to Kindles from Amazon’s competitors. 
The publishers would argue that under art 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union,
72
 the use of DRM is necessary to improve the production and 
distribution of e-books and promote technical and economic progress since otherwise 
users would be able to copy and exchange e-books freely and without paying for 
them. However, there is no to little evidence that copyright (and its protection via, for 
example, DRM technologies) actually does promote innovation,
73
 nor that in the 
situation in which DRM technologies were not used there would be no e-books 
written or that the quality would decline. In addition, since the goal of competition 
law is to promote consumer welfare as opposed to the welfare of the competitors per 
se, and since consumers and users benefit from zero or low prices (in the absence of 
predatory pricing), it is difficult to see how these agreements which restrict 
consumers’ use of e-books and arguably sustain indirectly (high) prices for e-books 
are beneficial for consumers. 
Nevertheless, this would signal a strong conflict between intellectual property 
rights and competition law, and in particular the provisions of the Copyright Directive 
on DRM circumvention measures. Furthermore, it is also unlikely that the EU would 
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take such a libertarian approach especially to the book publishing market and 
intellectual property holders. There are various protectionist policies such as allowing 
books to be sold at a fixed price and forbidding discounting below that price, as well 
as some subsidies for booksellers in certain European countries.
74
 It could be argued 
that these measures effectively support the legacy industries rather than the creators 
directly. Furthermore, prior to Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, 
compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) in which the CJEU held that inter alia 
intellectual property rights and their enforcement must be balanced with other 
fundamental rights such as free expression, privacy and data protection,
75
 there has 
been a tendency in Europe to go along with strong intellectual property laws and their 
enforcement. 
It seems that the situation in the US would be similar to that of the EU, although 
there may be more appetite for taking a libertarian approach to the book publishing 
market. However, as mentioned above, the US DoJ started investigating Amazon as 
part of its investigation into the Big Six publishers and Apple for alleged predatory 
pricing, but did not find enough evidence of this and did not continue.
76
 Also, the 
strong protection for DRM technologies in the DMCA would also point against such 
an investigation into Amazon on this point in the first place. 
Thus, it seems that Amazon’s business practices are unlikely to change as a result 
of the competition investigations and the antitrust lawsuit in the US. Even if Amazon 
is not a dominant player, it is still a significant enough entity to have millions of 
customers in the EU and US who are essentially becoming increasingly locked in to 
its digital ecosystem, especially with the move towards greater use of the cloud, 
rendering the devices used to access the cloud ‘dumb’. The strong protections for 
DRM measures and lack of clarity as to the legal situation regarding users who resort 
to self-help to liberate their data and devices from DRM for purposes other than that 
of copyright infringement do not help matters for users at all, as well as the fact that 
users who want to resort to this kind of self-help must be somewhat more technically 
literate than the norm and there are risks involved with the process. Aside from 
corporate greed there is little in the way of good reasons for companies such as 
Amazon not to present the digital content that users buy and the devices on which 
they use them in a way which facilitates easy interoperability. Nevertheless, the move 
to un-interoperable cloud silos would seem to aggravate this trend rather than reverse 
it, so the future looks pessimistic for users, their devices and their digital content from 
a user-autonomy-enhancing perspective. 
 
A possible Australian approach? 
 
As yet there has been no litigation nor competition investigation on these points in 
Australia, although given the increasing popularity of tablet computers, digitised 
content and cloud services, precisely what users can do with the devices and content 
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that they have legally acquired remains an issue in this jurisdiction as well. 
Furthermore, DRM measures remain topical given the negotiations currently 
underway on the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement mentioned above, which seems 
to include similarly restrictive measures regarding technological protection as 
contained within the Australia-US FTA (yet to be expanded to the other signatory 
countries such as New Zealand), while the Australian Law Reform Commission’s 
Copyright Inquiry has again recommended that a fair use exception to copyright 
infringement be introduced into domestic law.
77
 
There is one important Australian case on DRM circumvention, namely Stevens v 
Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment,
78
 which was decided in 2005 before 
the provisions of the Australia-US FTA regarding intellectual property were 
implemented into domestic law. The relevant law at the time was s 112A of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) which made the supply of a device that has limited or no 
purpose other than the circumvention of TPMs unlawful.
79
 The case at hand 
concerned the Sony PlayStation games console, which contained an electronic system 
that prevented games discs from operating with the console unless the discs contained 
an encrypted access code which the console’s system recognised. This access code 
was available on all Sony-authorised games discs, but not on unauthorised copies of 
these discs. However, this system also did not recognise the access codes from 
lawfully acquired games sold by Sony outside Australia, resulting in these discs being 
rendered unplayable on Australian-bought Sony PlayStation consoles, thus 
constituting an attempt to geographically segregate markets through ‘region coding’ 
(which is commonly used on DVD films). The appellant in the case had been 
commercially supplying a device (‘mod chips’) which modified PlayStation consoles 
to permit discs without these access codes to be played, thus allowing both copied 
discs unauthorised by Sony and Sony-authorised disks from abroad to be played on 
the consoles. The case hinged on whether Sony’s system which prevented games 
without the access code being played constituted a TPM, since it was accepted that if 
it was a TPM then the defendant would be found to be supplying a device which 
circumvented it. 
At the time, TPMs were defined in s 10 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to mean a 
device that was designed in the ordinary course of its operation to prevent or inhibit 
the infringement of copyright. The High Court decided that Sony’s device did not 
constitute a TPM according to this definition since it did not ‘prevent’ access until an 
infringement had already occurred — ie, an infringement had already occurred when 
a game was unofficially (that is, without Sony’s permission or endorsement) copied 
using another machine (for example, a PC) and Sony’s system merely prevented that 
copy from being played on the PlayStation rather than making it impossible or more 
physically difficult to make a copy in the first place. Thus the TPM itself had to 
inhibit the infringement of copyright, necessitating a causal link between the TPM 
and the infringement of copyright. This narrow interpretation of the phrase ‘prevents 
or inhibits infringement’ was motivated by the Court’s reservations around ‘an 
overbroad construction which would extend the copyright monopoly rather than 
match it’.80 The effect of holding that Sony’s system was a TPM, and thus the 
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appellant’s device circumvented that TPM and was therefore illegal, would have been 
to give consumers who had bought PlayStation games overseas no legal means of 
playing those games on their Australian consoles, even though this conduct in itself is 
not illegal. 
However, the user-friendly judgement in Stevens v Sony may not remain good law 
since it was decided before the Australia-US FTA was implemented into domestic 
Australian law.
81
 The FTA included provisions on TPMs which required a 
modification to domestic law and were subsequently implemented with the Copyright 
Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). There was a redefinition of a TPM (two new definitions 
were enacted — one refers to an ‘access control technological protection measure’, 
and the other a generic ‘technological protection measure’). Furthermore, s116A was 
replaced with s116AN which provides that an action may be brought against a person 
if they do an act resulting in the circumvention of an access control TPM protecting a 
copyrighted work, and which details limited exceptions permitting such 
circumvention. As noted by de Zwart, this is a departure from the previous situation in 
which the actual use of a TPM was not prohibited nor was an access control device 
included in the definition of TPM in accordance with Stevens v Sony.
82
 Furthermore, 
there was no explicit ‘fair dealing’ exception mentioned in the legislation,83 and fair 
dealing itself is a more limited exception to copyright infringement than the US fair 
use. 
In any event, as regards e-books and e-book devices, it would seem that 
Australian users are in a similar boat to their American counterparts, except (so far) 
without the possible protections that the fair use exception offers. According to 
s116AN(c) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), there is a limited exception to the 
circumvention of TPMs including DRM for the purposes of interoperability, but it is 
unclear quite how far this exception goes, and again it is a grey area as to whether the 
circumvention of TPMs for a purpose which is not to infringe copyright is permitted 
or not. It is submitted that Australian users should legally and explicitly be allowed to 
break DRM on their legally bought e-books and e-book readers in order to facilitate 
the interoperability that corporations like Amazon are trying to prevent. In addition, 
Australia should decline to follow the US approach in ReDigi by recognising an 
explicit right of first sale concerning digital content, even though the opposing 
example set by the European UsedSoft case may prove short-lived in the face of the 
migration of content from users’ devices to the cloud. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Given the major competition investigations into e-book markets in the US and EU, e-
books and e-book devices have been a very topical case study in order to analyse 
more broad trends in digital content and the devices on which they are viewed and 
enjoyed, along with the private entities which control links in the value chain. 
Although US and EU users can hope for lower e-book prices as a result of the 
competition investigations and the judgement against Apple in the US, cases such as 
ReDigi would seem to go some way to limiting what they can do with their digital 
content, along with the restrictions that the DRM architecture and terms of service 
                                                 
81
 Dilan Thampapillai, The Emergence of an Access Right in Australian Copyright Law (QUT ePrints, 
2007). 
82
 Melissa de Zwart, ‘Technological Enclosure of Copyright: The End of Fair Dealing?’ (2007) 18 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 7, 19. 
83
 Ibid 20.  
 25 
contracts impose as well. Thus far it seems that the law allows private entities active 
in these markets to replicate the restrictions inherent in the legacy markets for tangible 
cultural content through the use of DRM and other technological protection measures 
to create artificial scarcity in a situation of abundant digital content and so tip the 
balance of power in favour of copyright holders and device manufacturers, while 
denying users the rights they enjoyed with tangible content such as the first sale 
doctrine. Australian courts and policymakers would be wise to familiarise themselves 
with this practice from the Northern hemisphere and ensure that users at least have 
more control over their legally obtained digital content (including e-books), as well as 
encourage interoperability to prevent monopolistic cloud and device silos. It is 
submitted that two immediate steps that can be taken are to implement a fair use 
exception in Australian copyright law to secure users’ rights, and to ensure that the 
Intellectual Property Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership also results in a fair deal 
for users and curtails the trend of the over-strengthening of the position of copyright 
holders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
